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| Week - 01 | Syllabus Quiz |
| Week - 02 | Ethics & Ethical Reasoning |
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| Moral Philosophy = Ethics. Week 2 | |
| justification | definition |
| Critical Thinking | he deliberate process by means of which you distinguish what you know from what you don't. Open mind, care ful attention to details, what are the reasons for belief. |
| Arguement | A collecctive series of statements intended to establish a definite propsition. The process by which reasons are offered which recommend the general acceptance of a belief/judgement as true |
| Premise | A proposition which expresses evidence for accepting a belief or judgements as true |
| Condition | A proposition that expresses the belief or judgement you take to be true |
| Logic | The study of reasoning; it aims to discover principles for distinguishing good reasoning from bad reasoning. |
| Standard form | |
| Logical quality | Deductive & Inductive are the two standards used to determine the logical quality of a statement. |
| Deductive arguement | Logical Entailment. Statements of truth that link together to prove a point. |
| Valid/invalid | Validity is a test of the FORM of a deductive arguement. . A deductive arguement is valid when it is secured in such a way that it is not logically possible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion to turn out false |
| Sound | Soundness is a test of the TRUTH of a deductive arguement. A deductive arguement is sound when it has a valid form and all of the premises are, in fact, true. |
| Inductive arguement | Using probabalistic points leading to a conclusing |
| Weak vs strong | An inductive arguement is strong when the conclusion is very likely to be true on the basis of premises offered. Inductive arguements are probabalistic. Their form is such that thtey will never guarantee their conclusino. |
| Cogent | An inductive arguement is cogent when it has good form and all points are true. |
| Theoretical vs. practical moral reasoning | |
| General Moral Principle (GMP) | Tells us how the world should be. Not legal, prefrence or specific and can have lots of qualifiers. |
| Derivative Moral Judgement (DMJ) | |
| Factual Claim (FC) | |
| Normativity Principle | All moral arguements must include a GMP and a FC in order to be logically valid |
| Consistency Principle | same stories same judgements |
| Fallacy | |
| Naturalistic fallacy | when an arguement violates the normative principle |
| Tu quoque fallacy | Pronounced "2 quo qu-way". Means you also or you too |
| Moral conventionalism | everybody speeds therefor speeding is acceptable |
| Moral prudentialism | is ok or required because we will benifit |
| Moral legalism fallacy | using codes or laws to make a moral point |
| Slippery slope fallacy | deny action because of what it could lead to. |
| Argumentum ad populum | inflame the people's emotions to get them to agree to something they wouldnt normally agree to. |
| Red herrings | divert focus away from facts |
| prima facie principles | WD Ross, at first glance. There are 6 pinciples |
| moral presumption | same as prima facie |
| moral dilemmas | when 2 or more principles are in conflict |
| principle of equality | people should be treated in a manner that accourds to each an equality of respect |
| principle of honesty | moral agents have an obligation to tell the truth |
| principle of promise-keeping | moral agents have an obligation to keep their promises |
| principle of non-maleficence | moral agents have an obligation to do no harm to others |
| principle of beneficence | moral agents have an obligation to do good for others |
| principle of autonomy | people have the righ to live their lives as they see fit, so long as other's rights are not infringed upon |
| right of noninterference | the right to be left alone |
| right of control | the right to chose who takes actions against self |
| normative ethical theories | general moral standards of how we ought to live |
| ethics of doing vs. ethics of being | what should i do / who should i be |
| consequentialism | consequences of actions determine right or wrong |
| deontology | results irrelavent. based on rules |
| utilitarianism | the right action to maximize pleasure |
| kantianism | the intent of the person makes actions right or wrong |
| virtue ethics | ethics that promote virtue in the intended target |
| ethics of care | moral values geared towards caring |
| normative ethics | of "being" or of "doing" |
| deontology | |
| good will | |
| universalizable | |
| maxim | |
| inclination, | |
| principle | |
| moral worth | |
| duty | |
| the moral law | |
| categorical imperative | |
| practical imperative | |
| necessary vs. contingent truths | |
| a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge | |
| intrinsic vs. instrumental value | |
| perfect vs. imperfect duties | |
| acting "from duty" vs. acting "merely in accordance with duty" |
| The process whereby a given belief or judgment is supported by reasons that recommend its general adoption is known as: Logic [Justification] Inductive Deductive |
| This term refers to an error in reasoning which prevents the reasons offered for accepting a certain conclusion from providing any real support for the claim that the conclusion is true: Premise Justification Inductive [Fallacy] |
| In philosophy, the rational justification of a belief or judgment is expressed in the form of an: Fallacy [Arguement] Opinion Inductive |
| What does it mean to say that one's beliefs have been justified in an "objective" manner? (The reasons or evidence for believing depends upon physical objects.) (The reasons or evidence for believing depends upon information which is private.) [The reasons or evidence could be explained to and understood by others. ] (There is a lack of reasons or evidence to support the belief or judgment. ) |
| Logic is the study of the fundamental principles that enter into the determination of the quality of an argument. T |
| An inductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of (i.e. "entailed by") the premises. F |
| This fallacy occurs as a result of not recognizing the significance of the distinction between normative and descriptive claims, and the necessity of the former in any cogent ethical argument. [Naturalistic Fallacy] |
| This fallacy is committed when someone suggests that a certain action is not morally objectionable because others have done the same or similar things. [Tu Quoque Fallacy] |
| One commits this fallacy if one suggests that common or conventional practices in society provide the normative standard by which the moral status of actions should be judged.[Moral Conventionalism] |
| This fallacy occurs when one argues that some action is morally impermissible because the law of the land or some other generally accepted code of conduct forbids the action, or that an action is morally permissible because the law or some code of conduct does not forbid it.[Moral Legalism] |
| This fallacy is committed when it is argued that a certain action or practice is morally permissible or required because it will benefit one person or a certain group of people.[Moral Prudentialism] |
| This argument technique is fallacious when one argues that an action is wrong because it will "inevitably" lead to undesirable consequences without providing logical justification for the believing that such consequences are inevitable.[Slippery Slope] |
| This fallacy occurs in arguments which appeal to prejudices and biases of a particular group in order to get them to accept a moral conclusion for emotional reasons. [Argumentum Ad Populum] |
| This fallacy occurs when issues which are irrelevant to some conclusion are presented as though they are relevant in order to divert attention from the real issues. [Red Herrings] |
| The statement(s) in an argument which express the evidence or reasons offered in support its conclusion are known as: [Premisis] Fallacies Validity Judgements |
| Practical moral reasoning attempts to demonstrate the truth of some general moral principle, or claims about what sorts of actions are morally right or wrong in general. F |
| The essential difference between moral reasoning and other forms of reasoning is that the conclusion supported by moral reasoning is a moral judgment. T |
| The arguments used in moral deliberation are deductive in nature. T |
| According to the Consistency Principle of moral reasoning, if one judges that an action is right (or wrong), one is logically committed to judging that any other action that is like the first action in all morally relevant respects is also right (or also wrong). T |
| The basic structure of arguments used in moral deliberation requires which of the following? All |
| The process whereby a given belief or judgment is supported by reasons that recommend its general adoption is known as justification. The moral reasoning we will engage in this semesteris simply one form of justification. All rational inquiry, including moral philosophy, is concernedwith establishing beliefs or judgments that can be justified in an objective manner; that is, thebeliefs or judgements are ones accepted on the basis of evidence or reasons which could beexplained to and understood by others. |
| In philosophy, the rational justification of a belief or judgment is expressed in the form of anargument. (Common synonyms for the term argument used in this sense are "proof" or"demonstration".) In this context, the term "argument" does not refer, as it commonly does inordinary discourse, to a debate or disagreement between people (although arguments can andcommonly do enter into debates and disagreements). Rather, an argument is the process bywhich reasons are offered that recommend the acceptance of a given belief as true. |
| Logic is the study of the fundamental principles that enter into the determination of the quality ofan argument—the extent to which the reasons offered in support of a belief actually do providesupport for the belief. Logic represents what I like to call "the philosopher’s toolbox" because itprovides philosophers with the tools necessary for thinking critically about our fundamentalconcepts and beliefs (which is, ultimately, what philosophy is all about). In the next section, wewill introduce some basic terminology that applies in analyzing the general structure ofarguments, and determining their quality. Then we will consider the particular structure of moralarguments. |
| Any argument can be analyzed into two basic elements: (1) a conclusion, which is a statement (or proposition) that expresses the belief to be supported by the argument; and (2) one or more premises, which are statements that express the evidence or reasons offered in support of the claim that the conclusion is true. For example, consider the following argument: |
| It is clear that the world had no beginning, since if it did, there would have been a first moment before which there was no other moment, but every moment is preceded by some previous moment. |
| In this argument, the conclusion is "It is clear that the world had no beginning," and two premises are offered in support of this conclusion: (1) "if it did . . . other moment," and (2) "every moment . . . previous moment." The premises are helpfully indicated by the word "since." Other common premise indicators include the words and phrases "because," "for," "for the reason that," and "on account of the fact that." Note that the phrase "It is clear that" indicates the conclusion. Other words or phrases that may indicate conclusions are the following: "therefore," "thus," "so," "it follows that," "in conclusion," and "we can conclude that." Be aware that there are times when arguments offered in ordinary discourse do not make use of premise or conclusion indicators. When this happens, identifying the conclusion requires that we determine which statement in the argument the author of the argument is trying to support. |
| It can be helpful to make the structure of an argument explicit when writing it out. When this is done, the convention in logic is to write out each premise as a separate sentence, often numbered or lettered, followed by the conclusion. Sometimes a line is drawn between the premise(s) and conclusion so that their status in the argument is clear. If we do this with the argument above, we get the following: |
| (1) If the world had a beginning, there would have been a first moment before which there was no other moment. (2) Every moment is preceded by some previous moment. The world had no beginning. |
| Notice that when we put the argument in this form, the function of each statement is clear, and so premise and conclusion indicators can be removed. For clarity's sake, we can interpret the phrase "if it did" in the original expression of the argument in terms of its antecedent "the world had a beginning" when restating the first premise. (Other conventions apply in some forms of logic that determine the order in which the premises are written, but we will not consider these conventions here.) At times in this course, we will express arguments in this standard form to make the logical relationship between the premises and the conclusion clear. This technique can also be very helpful for making your ideas clear in your own writing. |
| There are two standards by which the logical quality of an argument (the degree to which the premises support the conclusion) can be determined: deductive and inductive. |
| Deduction: A deductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises. This "logical consequence" is sometimes referred to as entailment.The deductive standards are called validity and soundness. An argument is valid if on the assumption that the premises are true, the conclusion must be true (cannot be false). An argument is invalid if on the assumption that the premises are true, the conclusion still could be false. For example, consider the following argument: |
| (1) If the moon is made of green cheese, then the moon is edible. (2) The moon is made of green cheese. The moon is edible. |
| This argument represents the standard argument form modus ponens. This argument is 1 deductively valid, which is to say that if premises (1) and (2) were true, the conclusion would have to be true. Notice that the fact that premise (2) is false does not affect the validity of the argument, because validity has nothing to do with the actual truth or falsity of the premises or the conclusion. Validity only concerns the logical structure, and not the truth, of an argument. |
| The fact that valid reasoning is not dependent on the actual truth of the premises of an argument allows for the possibility of hypothetical reasoning: by assuming that something is the case (that is, by formulating a hypothesis), we can discover what also must be the case. For example, we can assume that the moon is made of green cheese and discover that this implies that it is edible. Hypothetical reasoning is a crucial tool in ethics as well as the natural sciences and mathematics. |
| Of course, if we want our deductions to provide real understanding, the premises we use we must be true. When a deductively valid argument has premises that are actually true, it is called a sound argument. The strongest argument which we can give for a philosophical conclusion is a sound deductive argument, but they are also the most challenging arguments to construct. Induction: An argument may fail to meet the standard of deductive validity and yet still be a useful argument in that the premises provide some degree of support for the conclusion. For example, no one could reasonably deny that the following argument provides some support for its conclusion: |
| (1) From the dawn of recorded history, it has been reported that the sun rises above the horizon once every 24 hours. (2) The circumstances that might prevent the sun rising over the horizon once every 24 hours (the sun exploding, the Earth leaving its orbit), are highly improbable.The sun will rise tomorrow. |
| This argument is deductively invalid (and, therefore, also unsound), but by another standard of logical quality, the inductive standard, it is quite a good argument. An inductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is supported by (but not guaranteed by) the premises. |
| The inductive standard of quality is known as strength. A strong inductive argument shows that the conclusion is highly likely to be true given the truth of the premises. In other words, the premises provide strong support for believing the conclusion is true. A weak inductive argument, on the other hand, would provide very little support for its conclusion. Notice that whereas the deductive standard defines only two values in assessing the quality of an argument—either an argument is structurally valid or invalid—the inductive standard defines a continuum of values, since there is a whole spectrum of degrees to which the premises of an argument might support the conclusion an argument, from very strong to very weak arguments. Strong inductive arguments with true premises are said to be cogent arguments. |
| [Modus ponendo ponens is a Latin phrase for "the way that affirms by affirming". This standard form of argument represents a rule of logical inference known as "implication elimination" or "conditional elimination".] |
| Like any form of reasoning, moral reasoning attempts to establish that some proposition or claim (a conclusion) is true on the basis of premises which support its truth. The essential difference between moral reasoning and other forms of reasoning is that the conclusion supported by moral reasoning is a moral judgment. |
| There are basically two forms of moral reasoning: (1) theoretical moral reasoning that attempts to demonstrate the truth of some general moral principle, or claims about what sorts of actions are morally right or wrong in general, and (2) practical moral reasoning that attempts to establish the truth of particular moral claims on the basis of general moral principles, or reasoning about what to do or not to do in a particular situation. We will consider examples of the first form of 2 moral reasoning when we study theories of Normative ethics and consider some arguments offered by moral philosophers in support of their theories. But for the most part we will be considering moral reasoning of the second type, a form of reasoning which is sometimes also called "moral deliberation." |
| Joan Callahan offers a good account of the basic structure of the arguments used in moral deliberation. One premise of such an argument will state a general moral principle (GMP), 3 which provides the normative criterion that is used in the argument. A second premise states a factual claim or claims (FC), and the conclusion states a derivative moral judgment (DMJ) that is more specific in application than the principle stated in the first premise. This structure is deductive in nature, since if the GMP is true, and the FC correctly applies the moral criterion of the GMP, then the conclusion must be accepted. The general form of the argument can be represented in standard form as follows: |
| (1) Any action having properties A, B, C . . . is right (or wrong). GMP (2) This action has properties A, B, C. FC This action is right (or wrong). DMJ |
| The properties cited constitute the moral criterion defined by the principle. For example, the principle of honesty states that any statement of a falsehood that is offered with the intention to deceive is wrong. The properties of the action in such a case would be that: the action is a statement, that the statement is false, and the action is intended by the agent to deceive someone. |
| Although this structure may seem simple, moral reasoning can be quite complex, involving not one but several moral principles, a variety of factual claims, and at times a string of preliminary arguments that leads to the final conclusion. All of these elements can be placed in a variety of orders, making it difficult to sort out. Consider this argument, for example, from John Stuart Mill's On Liberty: |
| ". . . Even opinions lose their immunity [to moral sanction] when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute in their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corndealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but many justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts, of whatever kind, which without justifiable cause do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when needed, by the active interference of mankind".4 |
| In this argument, the conclusion (DMJ) is stated first: that opinions may be sanctioned by blame or punishment when their expression under particular circumstances constitutes "a positive instigation to some mischievous act," or, in other words, incitement to others to cause harm. The GMP of the argument is stated last: that actions which without justification do harm to others may and in some cases should be controlled by "the unfavorable sentiments" (i.e., disapproval) or "active interference," such as punishment. |
| The factual link between the GMP and the DMJ is the claim that expressing opinions under certain circumstances can inflame peoples' passions, which can lead to harm. However, notice that Mill doesn't simply state this claim, but offers an example that he believes makes the point. This example is stated, furthermore, in the context of a more specific moral argument applied to this example, an argument that uses the same GMP as the earlier argument. Thus Mill's statement "many justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer" can be analyzed in this context as the following moral argument (I've restated some of Mill's claims for the sake of clarity): |
| (1) It is morally permissible, and in some cases morally obligatory, to sanction actions that incite others to do harm. (GMP) (2) Expressing the opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor will likely incite others to do harm when delivered to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer. (FC) Those who do this justly incur punishment. (DMJ) |
| Thus, Mill's argument is complex: interweaving two arguments—one main argument, and a more specific argument applying the same GMP to a particular case. |
| Analyzing and understanding moral arguments can, then, be a complicated affair. Some rules of thumb apply to the interpretation of moral arguments: |
| First, always begin by identifying the main conclusion (DMJ) that a writer or speaker is attempting to support by his or her argument. Next, answer two questions: (a) What general moral principle (GMP) does the writer or speaker offer as a basis of the argument? (b) What fact or facts does he offer that are relevant to the conclusion of the argument (FC)? Finally, if either the general moral principle or relevant factual statements are missing, try to state these explicitly. Often, if a writer or speaker does not state these explicitly, it is because he or she believes that they are either so widely accepted that they need no argument, or that they should be easily understood by the audience of the argument. |
| There are many criteria that can be applied to assess the validity of moral reasoning, but there are two formal principles of moral reasoning that are particularly important and fundamental. These principles are "formal" in the sense that they concern the form or structure of moral reasoning rather than its content. The first of these principles is quite easily grasped from the analysis of the structure of moral arguments that we just considered: |
| (1) Normativity Principle: All moral arguments must include both a statement of a general moral principle (a normative claim) and a statement of relevant facts (descriptive claims) if they are to be valid. |
| Put in another way, no derivative moral judgment follows from simply a description of facts. This principle of moral reasoning was first clearly stated by an 18th century Scottish philosopher by the name of David Hume. Hume noted that there is a logical barrier to deriving claims concerning how we ought to act from descriptive claims concerning the way things happen to be. This barrier has come to be known as the "is/ought gap" in ethical thought. One cannot validly claim that one, for example, ought to respect others merely on the basis of the factual claim that respecting others assures that they will treat us well. We must add some normative standard to the effect that being well-treated by others is a good that we ought to seek. (The Naturalistic Fallacy discussed below is one common way that this principle of moral reasoning is not observed.) |
| A second formal principle of moral reasoning is that such reasoning must be consistent: we cannot logically hold inconsistent moral positions in reasonably similar situations. This principle can be stated as follows: |
| (2) Consistency Principle: If one judges that an action is right (or wrong), one is logically committed to judging that any other action that is like the first action in all morally relevant respects is also right (or also wrong). |
| This principle simply states that rational moral judgment must be consistent over all cases of actions that are similar to one another in respects that are relevant to moral judgment. If, for example, one judges that it is wrong to cause other human beings great physical pain because pain is inherently bad, then one is committed to saying that it would be equally wrong to cause nonhuman animals great pain for the same reason. If one judges that this is wrong in the case of human beings but permissible in the case of animals, without spelling out how human pain is relevantly different from animal pain, then one's moral position is inconsistent and thus fundamentally irrational. |
| A fallacy is an error in reasoning which prevents the reasons offered for accepting a certain conclusion from providing any real support for the claim that the conclusion is true. In other words, a fallacious argument may seem to offer reasons for accepting a conclusion as true, but on closer examination it becomes clear that the argument provides no good reason for doing this. Logicians have identified many such fallacies—fallacies that arise quite commonly in debates and discussions of important issues. Below, I will concentrate on a number of fallacies that arise most commonly in discussions of ethics. |
| The Naturalistic Fallacy is a result of not recognizing the significance of the distinction between normative and descriptive claims, and the necessity of the former in any cogent ethical argument. The fallacy is committed when someone offers simply a description of "natural" facts as the basis for accepting a derivative moral judgment, without citing normative principles as well. Such an argument is never cogent, since descriptions of facts alone can never imply the truth of some moral judgment. Consider, for example, this moral argument against disciplining children: |
| Punishing a child for some wrongdoing is never right, since punishment causes emotional pain. The conclusion is a moral judgment, "punishing a child for some wrongdoing is never right," and in support of this conclusion a fact is cited, "punishment causes emotional pain". The fact itself, even if we admit that it is always true, does not show that the conclusion is true. The argument is based on an unarticulated normative claim, namely "Causing emotional pain is never right". But once this claim is made explicit, a number of questions are raised which the original argument doesn't address: "Is emotional pain always bad?" "Isn't it the case that in some circumstances linking a punishment with wrongdoing can effectively inhibit wrongdoing in the future?" Since the original argument doesn't state the normative claim, it avoids raising some very important issues that must be addressed in order to evaluate the truth of the conclusion. |
| One contemporary moral debate where the naturalistic fallacy is often encountered is in the abortion debate. Consider these parallel arguments, one supporting pro-choice, the other supporting the immorality of abortions in the first trimester: |
| Pro-choice: Science has shown that the fetus in the first trimester lacks the ability to u, v, w, therefore it is morally permissible to abort a fetus in the first trimester. |
| Anti-abortion: Science has shown that the fetus in the first trimester has the ability to x, y, z, therefore it is immoral to abort a fetus in the first trimester. |
| Neither of these arguments support their conclusions, since the facts that science uncovers concerning the abilities or inabilities of a first trimester fetus simply do not, by themselves, imply that abortion is right or wrong. What is needed is some consideration of the normative question of what sorts of abilities a living thing must have for it to be regarded in a moral sense someone who is a holder of the right to life—to be what in moral philosophy is called a "person". Thus, with respect to the second argument, a further premise is required that says "Everyone who has the ability to x, y, z, is in a moral sense a person," and the first argument requires a premise that says "Everyone who lacks the ability to u, v, w, is not in a moral sense a person." |
| Other examples of the naturalistic fallacy: |
| It is simply a fact that in our species, homo sapiens, sexual reproduction requires the mating of a male and a female, and it is quite clear that the diversity of two sexes developed through evolution as a more advantageous way to perpetuate species. Therefore, it is clear that homosexuality, which fails to perpetuate the species, is morally wrong. |
| [Comment: Variants of this argument have often been offered as a basis for a moral objection to homosexuality, but the reasoning is quite obviously fallacious. It simply does not follow from the fact that two sexes developed in evolutionary history as a basis for reproduction that homosexuality is morally wrong. To make this argument, one would have to maintain that any employment of physiological traits of the human species that is inconsistent with the employment that favored their perpetuation in evolutionary history is morally wrong. On this basis, one would have to conclude that playing the violin is morally wrong, since clearly hands did not develop in primate evolutionary development to allow for the playing of musical 8 instruments.] |
| Men need to feel dominant and to let off steam at times. So it is understandable that men get aggressive, even violent, at times. It's simply part of their nature. [Comment: Even if it is true that men are naturally more aggressive than women, this would not mean that aggressive actions on the part of men are morally permissible.] |
| This fallacy is a quite familiar one, often used by those who are attempting to absolve themselves of responsibility for moral wrongdoing. This fallacy is committed when someone suggests that a certain action is not morally objectionable because others have done the same or similar things. Typically the person who offers this argument is someone who has been accused of moral wrongdoing, and it is directed against that person's accusers, as if to say "you cannot accuse me of wrongdoing, since you are guilty of wrongdoing as well." The argument is clearly fallacious, since the question of whether others are guilty of wrongdoing is irrelevant to the question of the accused person's responsibility for moral wrongdoing: as the old saying goes "two wrongs do not make a right." |
| Examples of tu quoque arguments: |
| A hypothetical member of Congress states: "I'm not going to try to tell you that I didn't take illegal campaign contributions. I freely admit this. But if every person who ran for public office who took illegal campaign contributions were kicked out of office because of it, the halls of Congress would be considerably more empty than they are now." |
| A Mother to her daughter: "You should stop smoking. It’s harmful to your health." Daughter’s reply: "Why should I listen to you? You have been smoking since you were 16!" |
| Children often attempt to convince their parents that there is nothing wrong with something that they have done or wish to do because "all the kids are doing it." This is an instance of a very familiar fallacy known as "moral conventionalism." More generally, one commits this fallacy if one suggests that common or conventional practices in society provide the normative standard by which the moral status of actions should be judged, thereby suggesting that if people in one's society commonly perform some action, the action is morally permissible. |
| One problem with moral conventionalism is that often it is committed with exaggerated claims concerning the prevalence of the action that is adjudged to be morally permissible. When children, for example, say "all the kids are doing it," this often is quite untrue. But there is a deeper logical problem with moral conventionalism—it implies that "common practices" within a given social group cannot be morally impermissible, which on the face of it is clearly untrue. If this were the case, then the practice of slavery in the southern states of the United States prior to the Emancipation Proclamation would have been morally permissible simply because it was common practice—an absurd suggestion. |
| Examples of moral conventionalism: |
| Everybody speeds while driving on the highway. So, it is okay if I speed while driving on the highway, too. |
| "The Inquisition must have been justified and beneficial, if whole peoples invoked and defended it, if men of the loftiest souls founded and created it severally and impartially, and its very adversaries applied it on their own account, [funeral] pyre answering to pyre." [Source: Benedetto Croce, Philosophy of the Practical] |
| Hillary Clinton, in defense of her sending/receiving classified material via private email while Secretary of State, claimed that she should not be indicted because her actions were "in no way disallowed" as "my predecessors did the same thing, as did many other people in government". Moral Legalism |
| A fallacy that is closely associated with moral conventionalism is moral legalism. Whereas moral conventionalism appeals to common or conventional practices as a normative standard, moral legalism appeals to laws of the state or, more generally, any codes of conduct that are accepted within some social group. Thus one commits this fallacy if one argues that some action is morally impermissible because the law of the land or some other generally accepted code of conduct forbids the action, or that an action is morally permissible because the law or some code of conduct does not forbid it. |
| There are two main reasons why this form of reasoning is fallacious. First, the law does not forbid all actions that can on reasonable grounds be regarded as ethically impermissible. There are good reasons for this: legislating morality is not consistent with the values of a free and open society. If in every case of moral wrongdoing the government stepped in to prosecute the wrongdoer, we would find that the most personal aspects of our lives and personal relationships would be subject to the government's oversight—a way of life that would be demeaning to personal freedom and dignity. Another good reason for not legislating morality is simply the impracticality of enforcing such broad legal proscriptions: there is simply too much immorality in society for any judicial system of reasonable size to handle. Accepted codes of conduct adopted by clubs, professional organizations, etc., do typically make stricter demands of 10 individuals than does the law, but even these codes of conduct can fail to proscribe actions that are immoral. Thus an action that is allowed under the law or a particular code of conduct can still be immoral. |
| A second, and more significant, reason that moral legalism is fallacious is that it simply does not follow from the fact that a legislative body within a state or a social group decides that some action should be proscribed that therefore the action is morally impermissible; nor does it follow from the fact that such a body does not proscribe an action that the action is morally permissible. Historically it is not difficult to find examples of actions that can reasonably be considered to be morally permissible that were in fact illegal in their day. To take one quite obvious example from the history of our country, the founding of the United States as a separate nation from England was an illegal act. Thomas Jefferson, in the Declaration of Independence, offers a moral justification for the action, despite its illegality. A perusal of historical and present day legal systems will also yield abundant examples of the legal acceptance of actions that are on any reasonable standards clearly immoral, from slavery to mass extermination of cultural and religious groups. |
| None of this implies, of course, that we have a moral license to do anything we want to do, legal or not. There are very good moral justifications that one can offer in support of abiding by the laws of the state or the ethical codes adopted by other social groups. But in moral discussion and debate, it is not enough to cite a law or professional rules of conduct in support of a moral judgment—ethical principles and standards must be offered in support of adopting a law or rule as a reasonable normative standard. |
| Examples of moral legalism: |
| No one can seriously argue that Martin Luther King's acts of civil disobedience were right. |
| He was breaking the law, after all. |
| There is a law still on the books of our state which outlaws acts of sodomy, even between consenting adults. Therefore it is clear that sodomy is morally wrong. |
| According to the Ethical Code of our profession, article 3, section 2, a professional is allowed to charge whatever fees they wish. Well, I don't care that these people can't afford my services, and can't get the services of anyone else, I want my money, and there's nothing wrong with that. |
| Moral Prudentialism |
| Prudence is a normative standard of action that requires rational agents to act in their own best interests. Although it is often wise to follow the demands of prudence, and we do this every day when we brush our teeth, take medicine for an illness, and perform other actions that we believe will be a benefit to us, a fallacy is nevertheless committed when it is argued that a certain 11 action or practice is morally permissible or required because it will benefit (i.e.: is prudent for) one person or a certain group of people. Thus if someone were to suggest that each person has a moral responsibility never to help others when doing so detracts from their own interests, the fallacy of moral prudentialism is committed. |
| Note some have proposed a view known as "ethical egoism" which does not recognize moral prudentialism as a fallacy—in fact this theory says explicitly that the demands of prudence are in fact moral obligations, and thus we as moral agents are obligated to seek our own interests in all circumstances. However, no professional moral philosopher takes this theory seriously and neither will we; it is generally rejected on the grounds that it leads to absurd conclusions. |
| Other examples of moral prudentialism: |
| The practice of granting aid to foreign countries is immoral since the wealth expended in this manner could be used to benefit our own people. |
| There's nothing wrong with cheating on your taxes. After all, it saves you a few bucks in the long run. |
| Slippery Slope Arguments |
| A familiar tactic in ethical debate is to suggest that some practice should not be allowed because it will lead to "dire consequences'' for society. This sort of fallacious moral reasoning is common in political debates, consider: if sex education is allowed in the schools, the result will be rampant sexual promiscuity; if women are allowed equal status in the workplace to men, countless numbers of men will be jobless; if physician-assisted suicide is allowed, we will end up executing the physically disabled ("just as the Nazis did!"). Notice the general strategy here is to suggest that even if a certain practice of itself is not morally objectionable, accepting it as morally permissible will lead us inevitably to consequences that are morally objectionable, and therefore the practice itself should be proscribed on moral grounds. The problem with this strategy of argument is that those who use it often fail to provide logical justification for believing that the foreseen, undesirable consequences will be inevitable. |
| Considering the examples used above, there is no reason to believe that the availability of sex education in schools leads to sexual promiscuity, that equal status for women in the work place will lead to widespread unemployment amongst men, or that allowing physician assisted suicide will inevitably lead to executing disabled people. Without strong empirical evidence (which is typically not offered by people who use slippery slope arguments) the conclusion simply has no support. |
| Other examples of slippery slope arguments: |
| We dare not allow people in a persistent vegetative state to be taken off life support. If we do, it will be no time before we start taking people with terminal diseases off of life support, and the old people, and finally anyone who is not deemed to be useful to society. |
| There is an inherent danger in allowing any consideration of religion in public school classes, since although teachers may begin by teaching this material in a noncommittal fashion, it won't be long before they begin to indoctrinate students, and our schools will end up being evangelical brainwashing centers. |
| Argumentum ad Populum7 |
| An argument to the people in support of a particular moral judgment involves an appeal to certain popular prejudices and biases shared by a large number of individuals. Unlike moral conventionalism, which appeals to common practices, an ad populum argument is designed to inflame the passions of a certain audience, passions that will lead that audience to accept a certain moral conclusion. For example, consider a hypothetical example of a conservative religious leader proclaiming the following to his equally conservative congregation: |
| No one who is in the faith, and true to that faith, can accept the scourge of abortion perpetrated by the godless heathens that are destroying our society. |
| The reference to "godless heathens" and their acts of "destroying our society" will no doubt encourage many people to accept the implied conclusion of this argument, that abortion is morally wrong, but even if those who advocate the right of abortion in our society were primarily atheists, and even if these atheists were doing things that may be thought to be destroying the fabric of society, these facts would not establish by valid moral reasoning that abortion is morally wrong. In fact, these facts are quite irrelevant to the question of the moral status of abortion. This example suggests generally why ad populum arguments are fallacious: the prejudices and biases appealed to in such arguments, and the emotions they incite, are simply irrelevant to the moral issues they address. |
| Other examples of arguments to the people (ad populum arguments): |
| Social programs designed to aid the poor are immoral. After all, they are poor because they are lazy, and we shouldn't reward laziness. |
| Comment: Even if it were true that poor people are generally lazy—which is a quite simplistic and dubious explanation of the economic inequities in our society—this argument does not 7 Latin for "argument to the people". 13 establish why laziness should be a relevant factor in evaluating the moral status of social programs designed to benefit the poor. Shouldn't lazy people (as people) be entitled to some minimum economic and personal well-being? If not, the reasons for this need to be explained. However, this argument is not designed to offer any such valid basis for its conclusion—it simply relies on the emotional impact of the popular abhorrence to laziness.] |
| Experimenting on animals is morally wrong! Would you experiment on your cat or dog? |
| [Comment: We typically become quite emotionally attached to our pets, and this argument relies on that widespread emotional appeal. But our emotional attachment to our pets does not imply that it is morally wrong to experiment on animals, just as the fact that people become emotionally attached to their own houses implies that it would be immoral to raze any house.] |
| Red Herrings |
| Red herrings are issues or points raised which are irrelevant to the conclusion that is drawn from these points or issues. The strategy of this argument is to divert the attention of the person hearing the argument from real issues—ones that need to be addressed in order to evaluate the truth or falsity of a conclusion—to bogus issues, but in such a way that it is not clear to the hearer that the cited issues are bogus. |
| Consider a moral argument offered against the view that nonhuman animals are objects of moral concern: |
| It doesn't matter what we do to animals, people are what matter. Human beings have moral rights—you cannot morally do harm to any human being. Animals are not people, they have no rights. |
| All that this argument says in support of the claim that it doesn't morally matter what we do to animals is the undeniable fact that human beings have moral rights. But this fact is quite irrelevant to the question of whether nonhuman animals should be regarded as objects of moral concern. From the fact that human beings are objects of moral concern, it does not follow that no nonhumans can be objects of moral concern. The issue of the moral status or human beings raised in the context of this argument is, therefore, a red herring. |
| Other examples of red herrings: |
| Suicide is not morally objectionable, since it is a choice made by a person who is not satisfied with their life, and we all have choices to make in life. 8 Sometimes known as the "Fallacy of Irrelevant Premise" or in its Latin form "Non Sequitur," which means "it does not follow".14 |
| [Comment: There is no doubt that in many cases people who kill themselves genuinely choose that course of action, but this is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether suicide is morally permissible or not. Things we choose to do can be morally permissible or impermissible: that we do choose a course of action has no bearing on the action's moral status.] |
| Some people have objected to the past practice of dumping chemicals, saying that this pollutes the natural environment. Some have even suggested that this is immoral. But you know, our environment is already filled with chemicals. Water itself is a substance with a chemical composition. Plants have chlorophyll, and that's a chemical too. In fact, every substance in nature is a chemical. So there isn't anything wrong with dumping chemicals into the environment: they're already there! |
| [Comment: The objection to the dumping of industrial wastes has to do with their toxicity and their destructive effects on the natural environment. This argument simply misses the point.] 15 |
|
rights and right actions within ones rights is not always the right thing to do right to refuse refusing might not be the right thing to do one tho claims the right that to which they claim to have a right someone against whom the rigth is claimed. legal rights moral rights constitutional or legislative are legal rights (artificial) moral rights are in many ways opposite of legal rights human beings do not make moral rights are universal invariable natural fundamential not all philosophors or scholars accept the existance of moral rights legal rights based upone assumption of common moral rights moral rights are nonsense on stilts positive rights or negative rights or privilege positive right negative right |
| Ethics and Ethical Reasoning |
| The process whereby a given belief or judgment is supported by reasons that recommend its general adoption is known as: Logic Inductive Deductive Justification* |
| This term refers to an error in reasoning which prevents the reasons offered for accepting a certain conclusion from providing any real support for the claim that the conclusion is true: Premise Justification Inductive Fallacy* |
| In philosophy, the rational justification of a belief or judgment is expressed in the form of an: Fallacy Opinion Inductive Arguement* |
| What does it mean to say that one's beliefs have been justified in an "objective" manner?: The reasons or evidence could be explained to and understood by others. |
| Logic is the study of the fundamental principles that enter into the determination of the quality of an argument. True |
| An inductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of (i.e. "entailed by") the premises. False |
| This fallacy occurs as a result of not recognizing the significance of the distinction between normative and descriptive claims, and the necessity of the former in any cogent ethical argument. Naturalistic Fallacy |
| This fallacy is committed when someone suggests that a certain action is not morally objectionable because others have done the same or similar things. Tu Quoque Fallacy |
| One commits this fallacy if one suggests that common or conventional practices in society provide the normative standard by which the moral status of actions should be judged. Moral Conventionalism |
| This fallacy occurs when one argues that some action is morally impermissible because the law of the land or some other generally accepted code of conduct forbids the action, or that an action is morally permissible because the law or some code of conduct does not forbid it. Moral Legalism |
| This fallacy is committed when it is argued that a certain action or practice is morally permissible or required because it will benefit one person or a certain group of people. Moral Prudentialism |
| This argument technique is fallacious when one argues that an action is wrong because it will "inevitably" lead to undesirable consequences without providing logical justification for the believing that such consequences are inevitable. Fallacy of Slippery Slope |
| This fallacy occurs in arguments which appeal to prejudices and biases of a particular group in order to get them to accept a moral conclusion for emotional reasons. Argumentum Ad Populum |
| This fallacy occurs when issues which are irrelevant to some conclusion are presented as though they are relevant in order to divert attention from the real issues. Red Herrings |
| The statement(s) in an argument which express the evidence or reasons offered in support its conclusion are known as: Fallacies Validity Judgements Premises* |
| Practical moral reasoning attempts to demonstrate the truth of some general moral principle, or claims about what sorts of actions are morally right or wrong in general. False |
| The essential difference between moral reasoning and other forms of reasoning is that the conclusion supported by moral reasoning is a moral judgment. True |
| The arguments used in moral deliberation are deductive in nature. True |
| According to the Consistency Principle of moral reasoning, if one judges that an action is right (or wrong), one is logically committed to judging that any other action that is like the first action in all morally relevant respects is also right (or also wrong). True |
| The basic structure of arguments used in moral deliberation requires which of the following? General Moral Principle & Factual Claims & Derivative Moral Judgement. |
| Principles and Dilemmas |
| Engaging in the critical evaluation of moral beliefs that is the aim of Ethics requires that we first determine the source of moral values. False |
| Moral philosophy, or Ethics, is reducible to: Obeying the law / Doing what is best for oneself / religion / none*' |
| The Normative branch of ethics is concerned with determining general moral standards which prescribe how we ought to live. True |
| Unless there is some relevant factor that can be used to justify the unequal treatment of an individual or group, any difference in treatment suggests an inconsistency in the application of the standard of equality. True |
| The normative principles which define the initially intuitive moral presumptions concerning how we should act as moral agents are known as: Theoretical principles / Religious principles / legal principles / Prima Facie principles* |
| Moral dilemmas can be expressed as conflicts between prima facie principles. True. |
| Generally, moral agents have an obligation to tell the truth. Principle of Honesty |
| Generally, moral agents have an obligation to keep their promises. Principle of Promise-keeping |
| Generally, moral agents have an obligation to do no harm to others. Principle of Non-maleficence |
| Generally, moral agents have an obligation to do good for others. Principle of Beneficence |
| Generally, people have the right to live their lives as they see fit, so long as doing so does not interfere with the correlative rights of others. Principle of Autonomy |
| Generally, people should be treated in a manner that accords to each an equality of respect. Principle of Equality |
| Consider the following scenario and determine whether it involves a moral dilemma; if it does, explain the dilemma by identifying the conflicting prima facie principle(s). David, a single father, has promised his seven-year-old son that he would attend the son's baseball game on Thursday. Early on Thursday morning, however, David's close friend, John, calls. John, who has been unemployed for six months, has just been asked to interview for a new job, and if he doesn't show up today he loses his one firm prospect for employment. John's wife is away on a business trip, and so he needs someone to look after his infant daughter. John tells David he's tried everyone he can think of, and David is his last hope. David does not want to disappoint his son, but he knows he could not both attend the baseball game and take care of John's daughter for the day. |
| Your Answer: The principle of promise keeping is his obligation to go to the game, but this conflicts with the principle of beneficence where one should do good to others by babysitting to enable to interview. |
| Consider the following scenario and determine whether it involves a moral dilemma; if it does, explain the dilemma by identifying the conflicting prima facie principle(s). Jason is a lawyer who is currently representing Company Y in contract negotiations with Company X. The crucial meeting in this negotiation is today: if final agreements are not reached, Company X has said that they will end negotiations. Another client call and reports that a customer is suing her company for marketing a harmful product. She needs to talk with Jason over legal strategies in the case, and insists that he meet her today. Jason cannot help both clients today, although both clients clearly need his immediate help. Jason weighs his obligations to both clients. |
| Your Answer: Jason's obligation to represent his client company is the principle of promise-keeping and would interfere with the principle of beneficence of the good that would be done by addressing the additional client. |
| Yes, there is a moral dilemma. Note that, since both are identified with as clients, the principle of promise-keeping conflicts with itself. Lawyers have contractual obligations to serve the interests of their clients. |
| Consider the following scenario and determine whether it involves a moral dilemma; if it does, explain the dilemma by identifying the conflicting prima facie principle(s). Penelope works for a charity organization that provides funds for inner city projects that help the poor. She has been talking with a potential donor who is willing to give a very large sum of money to the charity, but this donor is deeply prejudiced against Muslims, and is not willing to give any money to projects in predominantly Muslim neighborhoods. The potential donor asks Penelope directly whether any of the money that he would donate would go to such projects. Currently the only projects that the charity is funding are projects in Muslim neighborhoods, and the charity’s Board of Directors has stipulated that all current donations must go to these projects. Times are hard, and very few donations are currently coming in. In fact, without this donation, many of the current projects will have to be canceled. Penelope considers what she should do: lie to the donor to secure his donation, or tell the truth. |
| Your Answer: If she lies then the would violate the principle of honesty, and this interferes with the principle of beneficence where the money would be used for good. |
| Consider the following scenario and determine whether it involves a moral dilemma; if it does, explain the dilemma by identifying the conflicting prima facie principle(s). Marcus Thompson, a 25 year-old bachelor, is employed as a clerk in a bank. His boss approaches him with a problem: there has been an error in the records of several of the depositors, which had the effect of crediting too much interest to some accounts and not enough to others. Marcus immediately realizes that he was the likely cause of the error: he wasn't terribly careful the other day, because he was thinking about the vacation he would soon take. He fears for his job if his boss discovers the truth. His boss asks Marcus if he caused the error, and Marcus considers whether he should lie about the whole thing or come clean to his boss. |
| Your Answer: Coming clean to the boss would result in him losing his job and this would violate the principle of non-maleficence, where telling the truth keep the principle of honesty. =There is not a moral dilemma here. Non-maleficence obligates us to do not harm to others, it does not tell us to serve our own interests (that falls into prudence, rather than ethics). In this case, based on the prima facie principles, the only moral duty is to tell the truth (principle of honesty). There is no conflicting moral obligation. |
| Deontological Ethics |
| According to Kant, it is morally acceptable to make a lying promise, so long as lying produces beneficial consequences for you or those you care about. False |
| Which types of action have moral worth, according to Kant? Acting unintentionally / Acting contrary to Duty / Acting merely in accordance with Duty / Acting (purely) from Duty* |
| Which of the following might be considered problems with Kant's theory of ethics? Kant holds that moral consideration only applies to “persons”. / A clever individual could phrase the maxims carefully so as to be universalizable and permit almost anything. / Kant does not provide guidance on how we can resolve conflicting moral duties (e.g. between two imperfect or two perfect duties). / All* |
| The term "deontological" is derived from the Greek deon which means: ordinary / overriding / optional / obligation* |
| In order to apply Kant's Categorical Imperative when deriving moral judgments, which of the following questions must we answer? What is the maxim of our action? / Would it be logically possible for a world to exist in which our maxim was not only an option for us - but a duty for everyone, always? / Could we rationally choose to live in such a world? / All* |
| What is the name of the general moral principle associated with Kant's theory of ethics? Principle of Beneficence / Greatest Happiness Principle / Hypothetical Imperative / Categorical Imperative |
| Kant aims to justify his ethical theory purely by a priori reasoning - based upon the concept of what it is for a human “person” to be a rational, autonomous agent. True |
| According to Kant, we are morally responsible for which of the following? For other people's understandings of our actions. / For anticipating all possible effects of our action. / For the actual result of our action. / For our motive to do good or bad. |
| The branch of moral philosophy which focuses on identifying and defending theoretical principles is called: Applied Ethics / Descriptive Ethics / Meta-Ethics / Normative Ethics* |
| According to Kant, because persons are ends they ought not to be used merely as means to ends. True |
| According to Kant, an obligation or "ought" is categorical when it is something we ought to do in order to achieve some ends or goals that we have. False |
| What types of moral duties can be derived on the basis of Kant's Categorical Imperative? perfect duties / imperfect duties / Both* |
| According to Kant, every thing which exists in the world has intrinsic value. False |
| Deontologists hold that moral value is instrumental. False |
| Does this maxim pass the test of the Categorical Imperative, or is it instead merely a hypothetical imperative? "I ought not cheat on this quiz if I do not want to suffer the consequences of getting caught." Categorical Imperative / Hypothetical Imparative* |
| Does this maxim pass the test of the Categorical Imperative, or is it instead merely a hypothetical imperative? "If you want others to be honest with you, then you ought to be honest with them." Categorical Imperative / Hypothetical Imparative* |
| Kant's "Cagetorical Imperative" is equivalent to the Golden Rule. False |
| Which of the following might be considered benefits of Kant's theory of ethics? Complexity / Relativism / Partiality / None* |
| Which of the following types of Normative Ethical theories might be considered Deontological? Kantian Ethics / Devine Command Theory / Natural Law Theory / All* |
| When Kant argues that "Duty is the necessity of acting with respect for the Law" which law(s) does he mean? State Law / Federal Law / Categorical Imperative* |
| Utilitarian Ethics |
| QUIZ LOCKED |
| Virtue Ethics |
| According to Aristotle, virtues allow a person to fulfill essential human purposes. True |
| According to Aristotle, all actions or emotions admit of a mean between excess and deficiency. False |
| Vices are positive traits of character. False |
| According to Aristotle, the virtue of courage represents a mean between the vices of _____________ and _____________. Humility & Vanity / Cowardice & Rationality / Meekness & Arrogance / Foolhardiness & Cowardice* |
| Which of the following does Aristotle identify as the condition(s) of "right action"? You must know what you are doing / You must choose the act for its own sake / Your act must spring from a firm and immutable character / all* |
| Which of the following does Aristotle identify as the "function" of human beings? Growth / Movement / Sensation / Reason* |
| Which of the following might be considered a benefit of Aristotle's virtue-based theory of ethics? Both motivation and consequences are recognized as being relevant to Aristotle’s virtue ethics. / Aristotle recognizes that human motives can stem from reason, but also from natural desires, inclinations or emotions. / Aristotle's account helps us achieve the right “balance” between considering the good of an individual and the good of her society. / All*] |
| Virtue ethics focuses on identifying a one-size-fits-all rule for determining what counts as the morally right thing to do in any case. False |
| In virtue ethics, the primary goal is to be a good person. True |
| What does Aristotle say about the view that human "happiness" is reducible to feeling pleasure? Pleasure is always incomplete / Pleasure is not specifically human / The majority of people identify happiness with pleasure / All* |
| According to Aristotle, the "supreme good" is: That which maximizes individual pleasure / That which gives the best consequences / That which accords with our moral duty / The end to which all things aim* |
| In Aristotle's theory, each virtue corresponds to exactly one opposing vice. False |
| The term eudaimonia refers to physical pleasure. False |
| What, according to Aristotle, do people generally agree to be the name of the "highest of all practical goods"? Pleasure / Honor / Money / Happiness |
| According to Aristotle, the goodness of anything must be assessed in terms of the thing’s: flexibility / foundation / function* |
| Why does Aristotle reject the identification of human "happiness" with honor? Honor is too superficial / Honor isn't an individual achievement / Honor depends on other people's preception of us, rather thatn on who we are / all* |
| One potential problem ith Aristotle's theory of ethics is that virtues seem to be relative across cultures. True. |
| Aristotle argues that every action or choice has a telos. True |
| Virtue Ethics helps us determine: Wheather a particular action is moral in all situations / wheather a form of ethical reasoning is virtuous / how to calculate between consequential and nonconsequential reasoning / How we ought to be* |
| Aristotle's theory of ethics is a hedonistic one, like Utilitarianism. False. |
| Moral vs Legal rights. |
| We are privileged, morally or politically, to do something just in case we are not obligated not to do it. True |
| Negative rights correlate with a duty one has to provide or do something for another. False |
| When attempting to understand a "rights" claim, which of the following need to be identified? Who has the right / What the right is a right to / against whom the right is claimed / All* |
| An action which is within one's rights may not always be the right thing to do (morally speaking). True |
| All philosophers unanimously agree that human beings have moral rights. False |
| If you drop a twenty dollar bill, you have a ___________ to pick it up. Positive right / Privelage / Negative Right* |
| Which of the following might be said to have rights? human beings / Animals / Corporations / All* |
| If you borrow my car, I have a _________ to that car from you. privelage / negative right / positive right* |
| How might a right "disappear" or be taken away from someone? They may forfeit the right / They may waive the right / The right may be retracted / All* |
| Which of the following are aspects of legal rights? Such rights are artificial / Such rights are limited in scope to a prticular nation, state, or locality / All* |
| Justice. |
| "[I]t is mostly considered unjust to deprive anyone of his personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law. . . . [I]t is just to respect, unjust to violate the legal rights of anyone." Respecting legal rights |
| "When . . . a law is thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same way in which a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infringing somebody's right, which, as it cannot in this case be a legal right, receives a different appellation and is called a moral right. [A] second case of injustice consists in taking or withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right." Respecting moral rights |
| "[I]t is universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether good or evil) which he deserves, and unjust that he should obtain a good or be made to undergo an evil which he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most emphatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind." Awarding by "desert" |
| "[I]t is confessedly unjust to break faith with anyone: to violate an engagement, either express or implied, or disappoint expectations raised by our own conduct, at least if we have raised those expectations knowingly and voluntarily." Fidelity |
| "[I]t is . . . inconsistent with justice to be partial--to show favor or preference to one person over another in matters to which favor and preference do not apply. . . . Impartiality . . . as an obligation of justice, may be said to mean being exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is supposed ought to influence the particular case in hand, and resisting solicitation of any motives which prompt to conduct different from what those considerations would dictate." Impartiality |
| "Nearly allied to the idea of impartiality is that of equality, which often enters as a component part both in the conception of justice and into the practice of it, and, in the eyes of many persons, constitutes its essence. . . . Each person maintains that equality is the dictate of justice, except where he thinks that expediency requires inequality." Equaltiy |
| Which view of justice does the following formula represent? X acts justly toward Y iff X gives Y at least what Y deserves from X. Strict Desert View / Proportinal Desert View / Sufficient Desert View* |
| This type of justice addresses the question of how wrongdoing should be treated (e.g., what kind of punishment is appropriate). Procedural Justice / Distributive Justice / Rectifying Justice* |
| This type of justice addresses the question of how benefits (education, pay) and burdens (e.g. military service, jury duty, washing the dishes) should be distributed among members of society (or of a group). Procedural Justice / Rectifying Justice / Distributive Justice* |
| This version of procedural justice is when there is some independent means of determining what the just outcome would be (e.g., through a theory of distributive justice) and the procedure is that one that is most likely to lead to that result, even though no procedure is sure to. Perfect Procedural Justice / Pure procedural justice / Imperfect Procedural Justice* |
| This version of procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed. Perfect Procedural Justice / Imperfect Procedural Justice / Pure Procedural Justice* |
| This version of procedural justice is when there is some independent means of determining what the just outcome would be (e.g., through a theory of distributive justice) and one had a means for guaranteeing that that result would be brought about. Imperfect Procedural Justice / Pure Procedural Justice / Perfect Procedural Justice* |
| Distributive justice is about fairness understood in terms of what people get (e.g. basic goods, recognition, rewards, etc.). True |
| Which of the following does Rawls identify as being a "basic liberty"? political liberty / freedom of speech and assembly / freedom from arbitrary arrest and siezure / all* |
| According to the "strict desert" view, justice and generosity necessarily conflict since generosity is a matter of giving someone more than they deserve. True |
| Rawls uses his “veil of ignorance” thought experiment to help illustrate how pure procedural justice might help us identify the principles which would govern a just society. True |
| Which view of justice does the following formula represent? X acts justly toward Y iff X gives Y what Y deserves from X (no more, and no less). sufficient desert view / proportional dessert view / strict desert view* |
| Rawls argued that no form of inequality can ever be acceptable in a just society. False |
| According to Rawls, whatever principles we would agree to ahead of time are principles that are fair (because they would result from a fair procedure). True |
| Rectifying justice is practiced before injustice is done. False |